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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest of
RICHARD S.,

Case No. 16219

a person under eighteen
years of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant has appealed from an Order entered on
December 12, 1978, by JudgeL. Roland Anderson, First Judicial
District Court for Weber County, which required appellant
to pay restitution for damage to five motor homes.
Appellant admitted to damaging one motor horne.

(R. 17).

All charges

concerning any other motor homes were dismissed by the Juvenile
Court.

(R. 16).
DISPOSITION IN LOl'lER COURT
On Septe~~er 20, 1978, appellant appeared before the

Juvenile Court and entered a plea of true to the petition
charging him with unlawfully entering one motor horne with
intent to commit a felony or theft. (TR. 1

).

The court

recommitted the juvenile to the State Youth Development
Center (R.4).

In the same order the time for a determination
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on restitution was set for October 11, 1978,

(R. 4).

On October 16, 1978, a second petition was filed
charging appellant with four additional counts of damaging
motor homes (R. 6).

Said offenses were committed at the same

place, time, and date as the original offense which appellant
admitted.

Appellant denied the additional charges and trial

was set for November 21, 1978.

On that date the court granted

appellant's Motion to Dismiss all four charges.

(R. 12).

On

November 21, 1978, and DP.cember 12, 1978, a restitution hearing
was held at which the court ruled that appellant could be
ordered to make restitution for damages to all five motor homes,
although he had admitted to damaging only one and all other
charges were dismissed.

An order to that effect, plus a

recommendation to the Youth Development Center that said
restitution be paid as part of parole from the YDC, was
entered on December 12, 1978.

(Legal File 17).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Juvenile Court's
order that he pay restitution for damages to all five motor
homes and also that the Court nullify the Juvenile Court's
recommendation that restitution be made a condition of his
parole from the Youth Development Center.

Respondent asks

that the case be remanded for findings as to the amount of
damages to the one vehicle which appellant admitted damaging
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and for affirmance of the Juvenile Court's recommendation that
restitution in a modified amount

be made a condition of parole.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts
with the following exceptions:
1.

On page 5 of Appellant's Brief he somewhat mis-

characterizes the statements of the county attorney regarding
the single criminal episode statute (U.C.A. §76-1-402(2)).
Mr. Gladwell did not admit that the instant situation was the
type contemplated by the statute, but rather that the adult
criminal code has never been adopted as part of the Juvenile
Court procedure and is not binding in determining whether a
juvenile is delinquent.

(TR. 15).

Nonetheless, the court

did dismiss the charges.
ARGUMENT
I.

Respondent does not contest appellant's arguments

in Points I and II of his brief, pp. 7-12.
II.

THE JUVENILE COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION
TO CONDUCT A RESTITUTION HEARING AND MAKE
AN ORDER AND REC011MENDATION REGARDING
RESTITUTION.

It is true, as appellant states in Point III of his
brief, that the Juvenile Court is a statutory court of limited
jurisdiction.

This court said in R. v. 1'7hitrner, 515 P.2d 617
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(Utah 1973) that the Juvenile Court has only those powers
which are specifically granted by the Juvenile Court Act.
Appellant suggests that the Juvenile Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the issue of restitution after
he had already been recommitted to the Youth Development
Center.

This argument is based upon the language of Utah

Code Annotated, Section 78-la-40 which states in part:
The continuing jurisdiction of the court
shall terminate (1) upon order of the court,
(2) upon commitment to the state industrial
school for an indeterminate period in excess
of 90 days, and (3) upon commencement of proceedings in adult cases under section 78-la-19.
The continuing jurisdiction of the court is not
terminated by marriage.
(Emphasis added.)
The purpose for the provisions of this statute terminating Juvenile Court jurisdiction upon commitment to the Youth
Development Center is only to allow the Youth Development
Center officials to administer their own programs and to make
necessary decisions regarding the youth and his treatment
plan.

The Youth Development Center has sole control over the

juvenile and his activities, his release and parole, after
the court has committed him, and the Youth Development Center
officials need not report back to the Juvenile Court.

This

was the clear intent and purpose of Utah Code Annotated, section
78-la-40, quoted above.
Juvenile Court from

It was not intended to prohibit the

co~pleting

a proceeding it had already

commenced against a particular juvenile.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-4Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the present case, there is no question but that
the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hold a restitution
hearing and to make an order regarding restitution even after
the appellant had been recommitted to the Youth Development
Center.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-Ja-39, which enumerates
the various dispositions the Juvenile Court may make after an
adjudication of delinquency, provides that:

"* * * (4) The court may commit the child to
the state youth development center or other
similar institution that may be available •••• "
It also provides that:
"(7) The court may order that the child be
required to repair or replace or to otherwise
make restitution for damage or loss caused by
his wrongful act, and may impose fines in limited
amounts."
And further, the statute provides that:
"(17) The court may make any other reasonable
orders which are for the best interest of the
child or are required for the protection of the
public, except that no person under the age of
eighteen may be committed to jail or prison.
The court may combine several of the above-listed
modes of disposition where they are compat~ble."
The order by which appellant was recommitted to the
Youth Development Center (R.4} also included an order that
restitution would be determined at a later date.

According

to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39, the court does have
the authority both to commit a youth to the Youth Development
center and to provide for restitution.

Where appropriate,
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several modes of disposition can be combined, Section 78-3a-39
(17).

That is precisely

what happened in this case.

The

same order combined the commitment to the Youth Development
Center and a provision for restitution to be set.

Surely by

doing one, the Juvenile Court does not divest itself of the
jurisdiction to do the other.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39(17) states
that any reasonable order necessary to protect the public
may be made.

In this case, restitution was necessary to even

partially compensate the victim of appellant's acts for the
damages he suffered.

On September 20, 1978, when the order

recommitting appellant to the Youth Development Center was
made (R. 4) ,.it was determined at the same time that restitution
should be made.

(TR. 2).

However, on that particular date

it was impossible for the court to determine what the amount
of restitution should be.

(TR. 2,3).

Therefore, the court

left that matter open and scheduled a later hearing only for
the purpose of determining the amount of restitution.

(TR. 3).

As the Juvenile Court said at the later hearing, because the
matter was commenced before the commitment to the Youth
Development Center and was only continued for the determination
of amount of restitution, the court retained its authority to
order restitution.

(TR. 7,8).

The unusual circumstances of appellant's commitment
to the Youth Development Center should also be considered b"'
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this court.

At the time of the occurrence at issue here, the

appellant had already been committed to the Youth Development
Center for other offenses.

He was home either on an extended

home visit (TR. 1) or AWOL (TR. 4), when he was involved in
the incident at Freeway Mazda.

He was returned to the Youth

Development Center by a police officer who arrested him on the
night of the break-ins.

(TR. 4).

Appellant ran away from the

Youth Development Center the same night, in fact "before the
police officer hardly even got off the grounds."

(TR. 4).

About two weeks later, he returned on his own to the Youth
Development Center and was there at the time the delinquency
hearing was held on September 20, 1978.

(TR. 1).

The order

recommitting appellant to the Youth Development Center merely
confirmed and approved the status quo.
order was made effective

~pro

In fact, the recommitment

tunc to September 4, which

was the date appellant voluntarily returned to the Youth
Development Center.
It would by highly inequitable to allow the unusual
nature of his commitment and presence at the Youth Development
Center to relieve appellant of his responsibility to make
restitution to the victim of his acts.

The Juvenile Court

had the jurisdiction, the authority, and the public duty to
order restitution in this case.
In his brief, page 14, appellant cites State of
Missouri ex rel B

C

C

v. Conley, 568 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1978),
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which discusses a Missouri statute similar to Utah's which
terminates Juve·nile Court jurisdiction upon commitment to the
state training school.

In that case, the Missouri court said:

Once a juvenile is committed to and received
by the division of youth services for internment in the state training school for boys at
Boonville, the committing juvenile court loses
jurisdiction over the juvenile unless jurisdiction
is returned to it in an aperopriate proceeding.
S68 S.W.2d at 608. (Emphas~s added}.
In the present case, the restitution hearing was clearly
an "appropriate proceeding" to return jurisdiction to the Juvenile
Court as the court is specifically authorized by statute to
order restitution from an adjudicated
Annotated, Section 78-Ja-39(17).

delinquent, Utah Code

The restitution hearing was

necessary to enable the court to make a proper order, and was
thus an appropriate proceeding over which to exercise jurisdiction.
The facts of the Conley case, supra, are not even
remotely similar to those of the instant situation, and the
jurisdictional statute is only mentioned in passing as the
Missouri court discussed the issue of whether a juvenile
should be allowed to have his case heard before a different
judge.

The case is certainly not very helpful in the context

of the present case.
Likewise, the other two cases cited by appellant,
In the !-'latter of A

N

~~~~~~=-~~==~===

, 500 S.W.2d 284

(Mo. App. 1973), and

Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Etc., 572 P.2d 451 (Ariz.
App. 1977), do not support the conclusion urged by appellant.
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(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15).

Both cases stand only for

the proposition that juvenile courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and may only make dispositions which are specifically
authorized by statute.

That theory is not contrary to respondent's

position in this case.

The State does not suggest that a

juvenile court can make a dis9osition which is not authorized
by the Utah Juvenile Court Act.

However, as has been previously

discussed, all dispositional orders made by the court in this
case

~

specifically authorized by that Act, Utah Code Annotated,

Section 78-3a-39.
Appellant also contends that it was not within the
Juvenile Court's power to recommend to the Youth Development
Center that restitution be made a condition of his parole.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15).

It is interesting to note that it

was appellant's counsel who suggested that very procedure to
the court.

(TR. 33).
The juvenile

courts~

authorized to make recommendations

to probation or parole departments regarding the collection
of restitution.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39(7), quoted

supra, authorizes the court to order restitution.

The section

immediately following that paragraph, Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-3a-39(8), provides as follows:
(8) The court may through its probation
department encourage the development of
employment or work programs, to enable
children to fulfill their obligations under
the preceding paragraph of this section,
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and for other purposes when deemed desirable
by the court.
Thus, the Juvenile Court was authorized to make a
recommendation to the Youth Development Center that payment of
restitution be made a condition of appellant's parole.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's brief focuses

prima~ily

upon the question

of the amount of restitution which was ordered by the Juvenile
Court.

Respondent does not contest the arguments raised in

Points I and II of appellant's brief.
However, respondent does disagree with appellant's
contention that the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction
to conduct a restitution hearing and to order restitution for
damage caused by the wrongful acts of the appellant.
has been discussed fully herein.

That issue

The Juvenile Court Act clearly

states and intends that the juvenile courts of this State shall
have the authority and responsibility to order restitution in
appropriate cases.

The victim of appellant's acts in this

instance has suffered a substantial financial loss.

Restitution

is certainly an appropriate remedy in this case.
Respondent urges this court to find that the Juvenile
Court does have continuing jurisdiction to order restitution
and to remand this case to the Juvenile Court for findings and
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an order for restitution in a proper amount.
Dated this 23rd day of April, 1979.
Respectfully Submitted:
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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Legal Services, Attorney for Appellant, at 385 - 24th Street,
Ogden, Utah, 84401.
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